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1. See eg Bruegel Policy
Brief 2009/01, ‘A lifeline
for Europe’s young
radical innovators’.
1 WHY WE CARE ABOUT FINANCE FOR
INNOVATION-BASED GROWTH
Europe’s innovation and growth deficit is rooted in
the structure and dynamics of its industries and
enterprises. In a Bruegel Policy Brief, Veugelers
and Cincera (2010) show that the EU’s persistent
business R&D deficit relative to the United States
can be almost entirely accounted for by the EU
having fewer yollies in new, high-growth
innovative sectors, particularly health and
information and communication technology
services.
Why is the EU on average and in contrast to the US,
not able to redirect its specialisation pattern to
new high-tech, high growth sectors? What holds
back new European firms in new markets from
growing into global leading innovators?
An extensive body of theoretical and empirical
evidence demonstrates the importance of
financial constraints as a major barrier to
innovation (see eg Hall, 2002, for a review). The
risks associated with innovative projects hinder
the ability of financial markets to swiftly allocate
funds to innovative projects. These capital-market
imperfections are likely to hold particularly for
young innovators (eg Hall, 2002). Although young
innovative companies are rich in intangible assets
such as technology and specialist knowledge,
they lack the sort of collateral assets that help
them access external finance. Young innovators,
combining the disadvantages of small scale, short
history, less or no retained earnings and more
risky innovative projects, can therefore be
expected to be more affected by financial barriers.
Although access to finance is a significant issue,
the importance of other barriers to aspiring yollies
cannot be ignored. These relate to the difficulty in
accessing lead customers, regulatory burdens,
access to skills, difficulties with intellectual
property and obstacles to partnering1. These
barriers are reminiscent of the often-cited
fragmentation of product, services and labour
markets in the EU compared to the US, as well as
the failure of the EU’s innovation ‘system’ to
effectively link its participants. All this is a strong
reminder that access to finance cannot be tackled
in isolation but should be embedded in an
innovation policy that also addresses the other
barriers to innovation. As these other barriers
reduce the expected rates of return on innovative
projects, they will affect the deal flow and the
appetite of financiers to provide funds for
innovative projects.
2 WHY WE CARE ABOUT VENTURE CAPITAL IN
EUROPE
2.1 Venture capital on the funding escalator
There are a range of individuals and organisations
that play a role in financing start-up or early-stage
innovative projects. These include family and
friends, business angels, private venture capital
funds, corporate venture funds and public funds.
All of these should be seen as playing
complementary parts along the ‘funding escalator’
for innovative projects. While initial ideas can still
be funded by own funds and those from ‘friends,
families and fools’, business angels come in when
the ideas move to feasibility testing and
prototyping. Venture capital typically enters the
frame when commercialisation is considered.
Start-up venture capital financing includes
financing for companies for use in product
development and initial marketing. Early-stage
venture capital provides funds to initiate
commercial manufacturing and sales. These
activities may not yet be generating profits. Once
sales are realised, internal funds and loans can be
part of the funding escalator.
The ability to secure financing during the initial
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stages of the escalator often improves later-stage
financing. This holds when the quality of the early-
stage funding selection provides ‘certification’,
reducing the typical asymmetric information
problems that plague the financing of innovation
projects. For instance, selection in highly
competitive public grant schemes may make it
easier to access further venture capital funding.
Firms that have been backed by famous business
angels may find it easier to access venture capital.
And firms that have been backed by quality
venture capital may find it easier to find financing
partners at later stages.
Nevertheless, the escalator seldom runs
smoothly, with entrepreneurs incurring
successive costs to find and negotiate with new
and multiple parties, imperfect transformation of
information between parties, existing financiers
expressing concerns about dilution and other
conflicting interests between old and new
financing partners.
2.2 The supply of venture capital to aspiring
yollies
When innovative projects from young companies
enter the commercialisation and growth phases,
venture capital becomes a critical financing
source (eg Lerner, 2009). At this stage, financing
requirements quickly become too large to be
supplied by friends or business angels. The high
risk profile of young highly innovative growth
companies is often a barrier to bank financing at
this stage. A deficient VC market may thus hamper
the development of young highly innovative
companies into world-leading yollies.
Venture capital is guided by the VC cycle (Gompers
and Lerner, 2004)2. After the fundraising,
screening and negotiating, the investment
process starts. At this stage, non-capital value is
added to the firms in VC portfolios through the
monitoring, advice and guidance of the fund
managers. The entire length of the investment
process for early-stage ventures is estimated to
2. Venture capital is defined
as dedicated pools of
capital provided by third
party investors that focus
on equity, or equity-linked
investments in privately
held, high-growth
companies (Lerner, 2009).
The limited liability
partnership arrangement,
LLP, is the dominant fund
model in the venture-capital
industry. The fund is owned
by third-party investors,
known as the limited
partners, and managed by
the venture capital fund
managers.
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‘When innovative projects from young companies enter the commercialisation and growth
phases, venture capital becomes a critical financing source. A deficient VC market may thus
hamper the development of young highly innovative companies into world-leaders. ’
be on average about 6-7 years. Exit is the final
stage of the VC cycle. This occurs through an initial
public offering (IPO), trade sale, secondary sale to
another financial institution or fund, buy back by
the entrepreneur or write off. The first of these, the
IPO, is perhaps the most celebrated and prominent
in the literature, yet the second method, the trade
sale is the most common successful exit method
for VC funds (Soderblom, 2006).
Venture capital financing has some distinctive
features. Because venture capital funding is
equity funding, it transfers part of the ownership
risk from the entrepreneur to the investor. Unlike
debt funding, it encourages venture capitalists to
provide managerial support to entrepreneurs. As
fund managers are typically rewarded with a
percentage of returns above a certain threshold,
fund managers are incentivised to focus on the
‘big wins’ from a portfolio of investments. In
addition, because VC is a very costly and risky
type of financing, high financial returns are
required from their successful investments in
order to be economically viable. The returns to
investment are highly skewed. Where attractive
net returns are made by the fund, it is likely to
result from the realisation of a small minority of
exceptional investments within the portfolio. A
consequence of this is that venture as an asset
class shows extremely large variation in returns,
and only a small number of exceptional start-ups
are likely to attract VC attention.
In summary, for venture capital to be a viable
business model, it needs to be ‘smart’, ie able to
select potential ‘hits’ and carry them through to
the exit stage by providing both financial and non-
financial support.
2.3 The demand from aspiring yollies for venture
capital
The number of companies requiring equity finance
is a relatively small percentage of the total
company population. For example, Shane (2008)
notes that since 1970, VC firms have funded
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3. A forthcoming Bruegel
working paper will provide a
more indepth comparative
analysis of the structure of
the European and US ven-
ture capital markets.
about 800 new companies out of the 2 million
started each year in the US (ie less than 0.05
percent of all companies).
The few firms that could access venture finance
have had enormous economic impact. Shane
(2008) notes that the VC-funded public
companies (1972 to 2000) generated 11 percent
of the sales, 13 percent of the profits, 6 percent of
the employees, and created about one third of the
market value of all public companies in the US,
with a few hits such as Google and Amgen
accounting disproportionally for these substantial
economic effects. Micro-level studies comparing
venture-backed young innovative companies with
comparable non-venture backed firms confirm the
superior growth performance of the former, both
in terms of employment as well as sales. And this
is not because venture capitalists succeed in
picking hits, but also because venture capital
funding contributes to value creation in portfolio
companies (eg VICO, 2011). A well functioning VC
funding system, through its role in smartly
allocating funding, monitoring and advising
relatively few high-growth yollies, thus generates
substantial positive effects for the rest of the
economy, despite its relatively small size.
2.4 Demand meeting supply: the early stage VC
market
The VC market suffers from ‘two tyrannies’: project
risk and scale-related costs. Project risk involves
problems in assessing “a technology that is
unproven incorporated into products not yet
demonstrated, for markets not yet developed”
(Murray and Marriott, 1998). The scale-related
costs are the relatively fixed costs associated with
due diligence and deal negotiation. The
combination of both costs with relatively modest
capital demands at early stage, compared to later
stages, may lead to a concentration by VC funds
on larger and later-stage deals. Only sufficiently
developed (‘thick’) venture capital markets can
build the critical scale and expertise needed to
overcome these tyrannies and avoid an early-
stage venture capital gap.
To avoid this early-stage venture capital gap,
venture capital markets need to be sufficiently
‘thick’. This requires:
• A strong deal flow of attractive, high-potential
portfolio companies;
• Large, professional VC funds of sufficient scale
and managerial competence to make initial and
follow-on investments and to grow portfolio firms
until attractive exit opportunities are identified;
• Informed institutional investors (including
pension funds, endowments, etc) willing to
accept the risks of early-stage equity investment;
• Support from professional services firms, such as
specialised lawyers, accountants and consultants;
• Efficient and liquid exit markets.
3 US VERSUS EU VENTURE CAPITAL MARKETS
It has taken the US several decades to build its VC
eco-system, which is the largest and most
developed in the world. The US accounted for 49
percent of total venture capital investments in
2008 in OECD countries. The United Kingdom is
the only other country with a share exceeding 10
percent of the OECD total (OECD 2009).
Comparing VC in the US and Europe is notoriously
difficult because of poor-quality data, and
international differences in definitions of VC3. With
this caveat in mind, Lerner et al (2011) find that
US funds are substantially larger than continental
European funds, make more than twice as many
investments in more firms with more money per
firm, and syndicate more.
As well as being smaller, the European VC industry
is structurally different from the US (NESTA,
2009). In Europe the bulk of equity activity is
focused on the expansion stage. Poor returns from
early-stage investments in Europe on a smaller
deal flow have significantly reduced the appetite
for early-stage VC. This exodus has resulted in a
funding gap in Europe for aspiring yollies that are
seeking risk capital in amounts that are too large
for business angels but too small for a majority of
venture capitalists. Table 1 illustrates the
European ‘early-stage equity gap’.
This European early-stage equity gap holds for the
three major countries, UK, France and Germany,
as Figure 1 shows. Sweden and Finland
concentrate on the ‘seed’ stage, but not (yet) on
the early stage. The US is the only country that
specialises in the early stage.
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Figure 1: Specialisation of selected EU countries in stages of venture financing
Source: Bruegel on the basis of Kraeussel and Krause (2011). Note: only the countries with at least 5 percent of the total
EU13 venture capital market are reported. Specialiation ratios are calculated as share of the country in VC stage relative to
share of the country in total VC.
As individual US VC funds get bigger they do not
necessarily move out of seed-stage investments
in new technology. Rather they use the scale of
their funds to make initial and repeated follow-on
investments across a portfolio of interesting firms
and technologies. The majority of successful seed
activity in the US is undertaken by large integrated
VC funds, each managing a big portfolio. They
attempt to make a number of extremely high-
return investments that are large enough to cover
the costs of the majority of less successful
investments or failures. This VC business model
has proven in the US to lead to higher investment
returns. For the model to work, it must be large
scale, with a large deal flow, and technically and
commercially well-informed and experienced fund
managers. For the smaller scale European VC
market, this business model is not yet possible.
These differences have implications for average
VC deal size. Table 2 shows that in the US the
average deal size is substantially larger at each
stage, with the exception of the later stage deals. 
With the caveat in mind that performance
indicators for venture capital tend to be highly
volatile and skewed, most studies confirm the low
rates of return of European venture capital,
although the funds in the top quantile can show
strong performance (Kelly et al, 2011). This
difference in performance does not seem to be
caused by US venture funds being superior, as
they do not create more value than their EU peers
when investing in Europe (Hege et al, 2009).
Instead, it seems to reflect the difficulty of making
commercial returns in Europe, particularly on their
early and seed-stage investments. Table 3
illustrates the lower success rates for EU VC funds
in the last decade, with lower successful exits,
Table 1: Europe’s early-stage equity gap relative
to the US
Total Seed Early Mature
EU13 (US=100) 50 38 22 71
Source: Bruegel on the basis of Kraeussel and Krause (2011).
Note: gaps are calculated as total venture capital investments
from 1985-2009. EU13 includes the major VC countries of
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland,
Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK.
Share of EU VC
market:
UK – 30%
France – 20%
Germany – 13%
Sweden – 6%
Netherlands – 5%
Finland – 5%
Table 2: Average deal size of venture capital
investment (2003-06), € millions
Investment
stage (EVCA)
Europe Investment
stage (NVCA)
US
Seed 0.425 Seed/start-up 2.181
Start-up 1.425 Early stage 3.499
Expansion 2.652 Expansion 6.011
Replacement
capital
7.208 Later stage 7.699
Source: Raade and Machado (2008). Note: EVCA = European
Private Equity and Venture Capital Association; NVCA =
National Venture Capital Association (US).
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4. Other studies have found
similar lower returns on
early stage deals in Europe
(Murray and Marriot, 1998;
Raade and Machado, 2008;
Hege et al, 2009).
5. Also in the United States,
government programmes
have provided a substantial
amount of money invested
in early-stage technology
firms, a sum about equal to
the total investments of
‘business angels’ and about
two to eight times the
amount invested by private
venture capital firms (Auer-
swald and Branscomb,
2003).
particularly for the very early stage  firms, labelled
as ‘infant’ firms4. 
In summary, European venture investing is still
underdeveloped. Despite some success stories
and a number of top funds that are performing
well, overall the European venture system is still
maturing. The average fund in Europe remains
significantly smaller than in the US. Facing a
smaller deal flow of high-quality firms that might
grow rapidly to become yollies, European VC is
less focused on early-stage technology firms, and
has less developed exit routes.
4 PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR VENTURE CAPITAL
The early-stage equity gap has led governments
to intervene. Virtually every major economy,
including the US, has implemented initiatives to
promote venture capital (Bottazi and Da Rin,
2002; Lerner, 2009; Murray 2008)5. Different
types of public support have been deployed,
ranging from encouraging investors through tax
breaks and concessions, to creating new pools of
capital through regulations and guidelines
allowing institutional investors such as pension
funds to invest in VC funds.
Many governments initially established their own
VC funds, but these have been largely abandoned.
Today government policy in support of VC typically
takes the form of capital participation in which the
state invests as a special limited partner in a VC
fund managed by a commercial venture capitalist,
the so-called hybrid funds. A special focus for
governments when sponsoring VC funds has been
micro-funds, restricting investments to below a
threshold (typically less than €2 million in total
(including follow-up investments)).
In sponsoring early-stage funds government is
pursuing other objectives beyond financial
returns. It is also interested in non-financial
results, including the development of innovative
communities in local clusters. These other
objectives have been partially captured through
investment objectives and restrictions in terms of
geography, technology, size of investment and co-
investment requirements.
How effective have these public interventions
been? The most important US government
programme includes the Small Business
Innovation Research (SBIR) programme. SBIR
funding is directed towards small companies to
support commercially viable high-risk innovative
projects. The SBIR is a highly competitive funding
mechanism. Owing to the high rejection rate, and
the high quality of the evaluation panels (which
include former venture capitalists and company
CEOs), the awards are recognised by private
investors as being a good signal of quality on
which to base funding. Lerner’s (1999) analysis
of the SBIR subsidy programme showed that the
positive effects of SBIR awards were confined to
companies based in areas with substantial private
VC activity.
The UK government also has a long-standing range
of instruments to support the VC market, and has
evaluated these interventions (NESTA, 2009a).
Overall, the UK evidence about hybrid VC
programmes seems to be positive, but the size of
the positive impact remains small. The current
solutions on offer have not (to date) produced the
disproportionately higher performance of VC funds
seen in US. High quality deal flow and
development of expertise at the funds is still
lacking. Constraining funds by restricting their
investments regionally, or preventing them from
‘following-on’ their investments in high potential
portfolio companies, has proved to be bad
practice. This holds true particularly for hybrid
micro funds. Insufficient fund size and restrictions
on the size and location of investments limit the
ability of these funds to generate commercial
returns. The evaluation also revealed conflicting
Table 3: Success in venture capital: Europe
versus the US
Success by
infant firms
Success by
mature firms
1985-99 EU13 39% 33%
US 51% 52%
2000-09 EU13 12% 19%
US 26% 30%
Bruegel on the basis of Kraeussel and Krause (2011). Note:
success by infant firms is defined as the share of all VC
backed (seed/start-up/early stage) infant firms which exited
by going public or through M&A. Similarly, success by mature
firms is defined as the share of all VC-backed later-stage firms
which had an exit by going public or through M&A.
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‘Politicians have over-estimated their power to redress the early-stage equity gap in Europe.
They severely underestimated the difficulties involved in rapidly building a viable venture capital
industry. Developing a viable VC and venture investing sector is a long term project.’
objectives between commercial success and non-
financial returns, such as local development.
These non-financial returns remain often implicit,
without clear mechanisms in place to assess how
different funds perform with respect to these
activities. 
5 LESSONS FOR POLICYMAKING
In the past, politicians over-estimated their power
to redress the early-stage equity gap in Europe,
looking for quick fixes. They severely
underestimated the difficulties involved in rapidly
building a viable VC industry. Developing a viable
VC and venture investing sector is a long term
project. American experience suggests that a
venture capital system in its initial build up stage
is very fragile and needs decades of experience
and public support to function effectively (NESTA
2009). Shocks to the system, such as the current
global credit crunch, can easily imperil its stability.
Views are polarised on how the government
should intervene to address the underdeveloped
venture capital market in Europe. If one accepts
that the supply of capital is a problem, then
government sponsorship of venture funds makes
sense, because it increases the available capital
supply. But, if the problem is the supply of viable
proposals – or that firms are not ‘investor ready’ –
then public sponsorship of funds will not
necessarily directly increase the willingness of
investors to invest. There is evidence for both
points of view. As the previous sections have
shown, the problem of Europe’s early-stage VC
markets cannot be exclusively related to an equity
gap, nor to an investment readiness gap, but to
‘thin markets’ (NESTA, 2009). In thin markets,
even if there are available VC funds and high levels
of potential projects, they may not be matched.
Below we list some of the characteristics, beyond
patience and perseverance, that policy
intervention needs in order to effectively address
the thin market for early-stage VC in Europe, and to
improve access to finance for aspiring yollies.
• VC policy should be embedded within a broader
innovation policy so that there is a sufficient
supply of profitable projects to fund. Successful
early-stage VC funds require a strong deal flow
of high-potential firms in which to invest. A
strong deal flow will allow VC funds to specialise
and to build the technical and commercial
knowledge required to identify and support
aspiring yollies.
• VC policymakers should be the lubricant for the
funding escalator. Different policy interventions
are needed at each stage of the funding
escalator. Policy tools need to be part of a
holistic strategy, so that support is continuous
through the stages. A holistic approach
includes, in addition to support for private
capital investments, grants for pre-competitive
R&D, policies promoting business angel
groups, public procurement based innovation
contracts and government-backed lending.
• VC policy should avoid the ‘short is beautiful’
trap. Policies and programmes that focus
exclusively on filling narrow funding gaps can
be counter-productive as they can create
artificial barriers between successive rounds
of funding. 
• VC policy should avoid the ‘small is beautiful’
trap. Small micro funds are often not viable and
have insufficient financial resources to cover
their high fixed costs (especially expert
management), diversify their portfolios or
provide the follow-on funding to the most
promising investments in their portfolios. 
• VC policy should avoid the ‘local is beautiful’
trap. Limiting funds to investment in
geographically defined areas is likely to have a
negative impact on the size of the pool of firms
they can invest in.
Overall, these characteristics call for a significant
reorientation of the all-too-often pursued policies
in many European countries, which support sub-
critical regional funds aimed at supporting a tail
of average or below-average potential growth
firms. Rather than the quantity of VC available,
what matters more is how effectively the market
Reinhilde Veugelers  MIND EUROPE’S EARLY-STAGE EQUITY GAP
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6. http://ec.europa.eu/
research/evaluations/index
_en.cfm?pg=rsff
allocates VC to the most promising projects.
6 SUGGESTING CONCRETE EU POLICY PROPOSALS 
The critical size for a viable, fluid, thick European
VC market can only be reached when VC markets
operate at an integrated European scale and are
open to the world. Removing fragmentation in the
EU venture capital market should therefore be
high on the policy agenda. Furthering market
integration also holds with respect to European
stock markets for young firms, being a critical exit
for VC funds. And to improve deal flows, EU
integration should also be pushed further in terms
of innovative procurement and lead-user markets,
raising the prospective returns on innovative
projects. 
Beyond furthering the single market agenda, what
follows are suggestions for new initiatives at the
EU level that help redress Europe’s deficit in
financing aspiring yollies. Taking a subsidiarity
perspective, such EU intervention should
stimulate the development of better instruments
in member states and/or design instruments at
the EU level that can capitalise on economies of
scale.
6.1 Supporting member state initiatives
Evidence from the US and the UK shows how
policy learning effects have gradually improved
policies (NESTA, 2009a). Experimenting with new
instruments and regularly evaluating existing
programmes, and abandoning or restructuring
them when inefficient, should therefore be high on
the policy agenda. 
The difficulties that the US has had getting its
support institutions to work, and its many unique
environmental features, suggest that it is
unrealistic to expect US-style institutions to be
easily transferable to other countries.
Nevertheless, lessons can be learned from cross-
country comparisons. An important contribution
that the EU level can provide to member states is
the provision of a platform dedicated for learning
VC policy lessons.
At EU level, the commissioners for innovation and
competition policy should closely coordinate to
ensure that state aid rules governing member
state support for VC funding effectively power
innovation while safeguarding fair competition.
6.2 Re-aligning existing instruments into a
holistic policy framework 
The EU already has in place a number of specific
venture capital policy programmes. The main
financing initiatives at EU level are the European
Investment Bank’s Risk Sharing Finance Facility
(RSFF) for large and mid-sized companies, and its
freshly launched Risk Sharing Instrument (RSI)
equivalent for SMEs, as well as the High Growth
and Innovative SME Facility (GIF). In addition, the
Structural Funds, through the European Regional
Development Fund (ERDF) and various supporting
initiatives (JEREMIE) have stimulated significant
investment in national and regional early-stage
and VC funds. Evidence for the effectiveness of the
EU level instruments is poor and mixed. 
A problem with the EU instruments is that they are
not designed as part of a holistic approach to
address the funding escalator for aspiring yollies.
For example, the loans covered by the EIB’s Risk
Sharing Finance Facility have been recently
evaluated as successful in addressing the need
for financing of larger innovative projects at later
stages6. This instrument is however for the
moment not sufficiently addressing the need for
loans of aspiring yollies after they have gone
through rounds of early-stage venture funding. It
remains to be seen if the recently launched RSI
might redress this.
Grants for research and pre-competitive
development are currently covered by the
Framework Programme (FP), with the majority of
this funding going into cross-border cooperative
projects. Despite the increased efforts to involve
innovative SMEs in these projects, this instrument
is not rated to be a significant source of financing
by young highly innovative companies (eg NESTA,
2009a). The costs of administration and
coordination of partners are prohibitive. Beyond
improving directly the access to grant funding for
young highly innovative firms, Horizon 2020 (the
next generation of the Framework Programme),
grant funding needs to be integrated into a holistic
policy approach addressing the finance escalator.
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To this end, grant selection and evaluation should
help pave the way for financing the next stages of
commercialisation of FP-funded ideas, without
necessarily funding commercialisation itself, as
the next suggestion will illustrate.
6.3 Filling the funding escalator with new EU
initiatives
i) Grants for yollies to bridge the lab-to-market
gap
Still missing at EU level is an instrument to
address the shortcomings of the financial market
at the pre-commercialisation phase that affects
young highly innovative firms. Inspired by the US
SBIR, a previous Bruegel Policy Brief (2009/01)
proposed a similar EU system of grants for the
high-risk innovative projects of young companies,
during the critical start-up and development
stages, when financial market barriers are at their
highest. If implemented properly, the programme
will not only enhance the chances of success of
the projects being funded but will also, through
‘certification’, ease the access to private VC
investment at later phases of the project. This
implies a critical role for the selection and
evaluation process for these grants, which should
involve the expertise of entrepreneurs, business
angels and venture capitalists.
ii) A fund-of-funds to leverage Europe’s early-
stage VC market
While the grants for yollies proposal would help to
address the ‘investment readiness’ gap,
simultaneously needed in Europe are VC funds of
sufficiently critical scale that are willing and able
to fund highly innovative projects from their early
stages. The European Commission is proposing a
fund-of-funds as part of Horizon 2020. This fund-
of-funds should be given a clear mandate for
targeted stake-taking in private VC  funds in
Europe, which have the potential to grow to critical
scale. Restrictions on portfolio investments
should be avoided so that they do not impede the
build-up to critical scale.
iii) Leveraging member-state procurement
budgets for innovative purposes
Revenues from contracts with early lead
customers can be another important source of
funding for aspiring yollies. In a number of
markets, these early customers are public agents,
who can through innovative public procurement
help to alleviate the early-stage finance gap (see
Technopolis, 2011). The US success in information
technology is often attributed to a successful
public-procurement role played by government
agencies such as the Department of Defense and
NASA. Small companies receive special attention
through the SBIR procurement programme.
The development of European equivalents to the
US SBIR procurement model, such as the UK
Department of Health’s research and development
programme  needs to be supported. The EU level
should provide a forum for policy learning and
diffusion of good practice relating to procurement
policies for innovation. The EU should also
consider providing financial support by topping-
up member state programmes aimed at
innovative procurement, which have been
designed according to good practice guidelines.
iv) Increasing VC expertise
To increase the number of quality VC firms with
professional managers with top abilities to select
and support aspiring yollies, Europe should tackle
VC education more seriously7.
Finally, as the evidence suggests that there are
plenty of ineffective public schemes in Europe
supporting mediocre deals at mediocre funds,
evaluating and shutting down the failures would
free up enough funds to allow a significant shift
towards a more effective venture investing
system focused on high quality VC meeting
aspiring yollies at little additional cost and high
expected returns to the European taxpayer.
7. The Kauffman Fellows
Program could serve as
inspiration. It provides a
structured, experiential
education programme with
the purpose of identifying,
developing and networking
the next generation of
global leaders in venture
capital (see http://www.
kauffmanfellows.org/
curriculum.aspx).
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